Search results for " Particularism"

showing 5 items of 5 documents

Particularismes i populismes als països de llengua catalana

2020

[cat] L'article analitza breument l'ampla varietat de conceptes de populisme en la política actual. Aquesta anàlisi intenta mostrar com el populisme ha donat suport als particularismes lingüístics a València i a Mallorca. Aquests particularismes (anomenats blaverisme a València, i gonellisme a Mallorca) no reconeixen la unitat de la comunitat lingüística catalana, i per tant amenacen la recuperació social (normalització) de la llengua catalana.

Catalan languageValencian CommunityPopulismParticularismeStandard languagei gonellisme a Mallorca) no reconeixen la unitat de la comunitat lingüística catalanaPaís ValenciàEmili L?article analitza breument l?ampla varietat de conceptes de populisme en la política actual. Aquesta anàlisi intenta mostrar com el populisme ha donat suport als particularismes lingüístics a València i a Mallorca. Aquests particularismes ( anomenats blaverisme a València:SOCIOLOGÍA [UNESCO]Secessionlinguistic particularism 285 296Mallorca (Illes Balears)Catalani per tant amenacen la recuperació social (normalització) de la llengua catalana CatalanCatalàLlengua estàndard1137-7038 8537 Arxius de sociologia 562372 2020 42 7674047 Particularismes i populismes als països de llengua catalana BoixUNESCO::SOCIOLOGÍASecessióValenciaMajorca (Balearic Islands)Populisme
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True Exceptions:Defeasibility and Particularism

2012

Sometimes, kinds of cases which do in fact fall under the antecedent of a conditional norm are reckoned recalcitrant. I.e., although they fall under the antecedent of the norm we do not wish to allow the consequence to follow. In such cases, we sometimes say that we are abandoning, or discarding, the norm. We concede, that is, that the alleged norm was wrong (or, if you wish, that it was no norm at all). At other times, however, it is claimed that the norm is a defeasible one. Granted, the case at hand is one of those in which the norm is defeated; but this, it is implied, does not amount to a wholesale abandonment of the norm itself. Being defeasible, the norm somehow survives the impact o…

Settore IUS/20 - Filosofia Del DirittoDefeasibility Particularism Practical reasoning Norms Rules
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Ragionamento giuridico. Particolarismo. In difesa di un approccio psicologistico

2017

Legal Reasoning, Particularism: In Defense of a Psychologistic Approach. In this paper I recommend a close examination of the reasons favouring a deep and potentially far reaching reorientation of legal theory, and of the theory of norms and norm-based reasoning and decision-making generally, namely, the adoption of a psychologistic approach (“psychodeontics”). I argue in favour of psychologism - not in the anstract, but - with reference to rwo particular topics: legal reasoning (specifically, the justification of judicial decisions) and the project of a of two-tier (principles v. rules) theory of law, informed by a particularistic conception of practical reasoning. I show that there are as…

Settore IUS/20 - Filosofia Del DirittoLegal reasoning Normativity Psychologism Particularism Exceptions
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Reasons, Rules, Exceptions. Towards a Psychological Account

2018

In this paper we defend a psychological account of rule-based reasoning, specifically of the relationship between rules and exceptions. The topic of our inquiry are the relations between rules, the reasons underlying them, and exceptions. In analysing these relations, first, we outline an apparent paradox, the “paradox of rules”, and a related problem, the “problem of reconsideration”. Then, we propose a solution to, or better dissolution of, the paradox, grounded in an account of the psychological processes underlying rule-application and reconsideration. We claim, that is, that the problem of reconsideration should be answered by appealing to matters of sheer psychological fact. The upsho…

Settore IUS/20 - Filosofia Del DirittoRules. Exceptions. Particularism. Psychologism. Rule-based reasoning.Settore M-FIL/03 - Filosofia Morale
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¿Qué podemos pedir a una teoría de la justicia? Algunas consideraciones acerca de un debate entre Amartya Sen y John Rawls

2010

In this paper I try to revise Sen’s thesis about the «transcendental» nature of Rawls’ theory of justice. According to Sen transcendental theories of justice are unnecessary. What we aim at is to justify a series of comparative judgements about two or more states of affairs.We do not strive, unlike Rawls, to form a complete system of moral principles that backs an «ideal just society». I try to show that Sen’s «comparative» account is weak. First of all, Sen does not offer a fair interpretation of Rawls’ theory. In particular, he is wrong when he depicts Rawls’ justice as fairness as a complete and transcendental moral doctrine. Secondly, Sen overlooks the fact that in order to justify comp…

Settore IUS/20 - Filosofia Del Dirittoparticularismo moralmedia_common.quotation_subjectB1-5802Theories of distributive justice Rawls Sen moral pluralism moral particularismTeorías de justicia distributivaIdeal (ethics)moral particularismPolitical philosophyPhilosophy (General)lcsh:B1-5802media_commonJust societymoral pluralismlcsh:Philosophy (General)Interpretation (philosophy)PhilosophyTheories of distributive justiceDoctrineMoral particularismpluralismo moralEpistemologyPhilosophyJustice (virtue)SenRawlsTranscendental number
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